What does Alexei Navalny’s death tell us? That Putin seems to be devising his most ominous scheme yet

It is difficult not to equate the untimely death of Alexei Navalny with the death of Russian opposition. With just a few weeks before the sham election scripted to result in Vladimir Putin’s appointment for a fifth term as Russia’s president, Navalny’s death foreshadows a grim post-election future for Russia, Ukraine and the world.

Within Russia, Navalny will be irreplaceable in his ability to connect, to charm and to mobilise. With most of his allies now in exile, and the Kremlin’s stranglehold on the digital public square tighter than ever, the very avenues Navalny navigated to reach the hearts and minds of young people are fast disappearing. It is hard to see where a successor would emerge from. And so the Russian opposition has no leader, no focal point to unite behind, no face to represent it, no voice to speak on its behalf.

This dark turn of events is not just a tragedy for Russia; it’s a chilling signal to advocates of liberal democracy everywhere. It’s often said that hope shines brightest in the darkest times, suggesting that a turn for the better is just around the corner. Yet in the context of Russia’s current state, such optimism seems misplaced. The nation is not primed for widespread protest. And paradoxically, the war in Ukraine may have inadvertently bolstered certain sectors of Russia’s economy, revitalising arms production and generating military employment opportunities for unskilled workers.

And while the masses revel in these new-found economic opportunities, the death of Navalny sends a loud and clear message to future opposition as well as the intellectual elites: dissent is no longer an option in Putin’s Russia. Russia today is a country where one cannot even lay flowers as a memorial without the threat of arrest.

At first glance, it look like Putin wins all round. Navalny, with his clever gimmicks aimed at disrupting Putin’s political choreography, was the last source of uncertainty for the highly anticipated election win. Domestically, Putin appears unstoppable. He reigns supreme. He acts with impunity. His word is sacrosanct. He faces no consequences for his actions.

However, this narrative doesn’t fully make sense. Winning an election against a deceased opponent hardly portrays Putin as a figure of formidable strength. The question then arises: why target Navalny now? He has been a known figure for more than a decade, and Putin had effectively neutralised Navalny’s previous challenges through more conventional tactics, such as disqualifying him from running for office in the 2018 presidential election. With Navalny confined to an Arctic prison, his ability to pose a threat seemed even more diminished.

There is only one explanation – and it’s a grim one. Political science research shows that the times of strength are the best times for autocrats to safeguard themselves against future political challenges. When a challenge arises, it may be too late to consolidate power. Putin is in a position of strength right now, and he knows that this is his time to prepare the ground for a big move in the future. He is clearing the decks. He knows he is no spring chicken, and he may wish to commit fully to what he really wants: finally taking Ukraine.

He is growing impatient of waiting – for western support to dwindle, and for more favourable political forces to take power in Europe and the United States. He needs his hands untied, so he can do what it takes: declare total mobilisation, further ramp up military production, even at the price of an economic contraction and the risk of renewed domestic opposition. When he does so, he doesn’t want charismatic leaders such as Navalny dampening his political support at home, even in a limited way.

A bold move such as getting rid of a key political opponent might not make sense if Putin simply wanted to continue with business as usual after an election whose outcome is already guaranteed. It makes more sense if Putin is preparing to take a new, more politically fraught course. In that case, he would want to leave nothing to chance. Whatever he has planned, with Navalny dead, even the slim possibility of political resistance within Russia is likely now extinguished.

This suggests that any potential for change in Russia now hinges on external influences. Ironically, Russia’s greatest hope for a liberal future is Ukraine. For the west, the death of Navalny might be the last wake-up call before it is too late. The time to support Ukraine is running out. Amid debates in US Congress over the latest aid package and the EU’s hesitation in prioritising its own military industrial production, Putin is devising his most ominous scheme yet. The west must brace itself for a post-election Putin, an unrestrained despot determined to achieve his objectives at any cost.