Great Power Competition Comes for the South Pole

On February 2, the Peoples’ Republic of China announced plans to construct new satellite ground stations around the Zongshan Antarctic research facility. Stated to improve China’s supposed remote sensing and data collection capabilities around the pole, the stations add to a growing network of Chinese space research bases now stretching from Antarctica up through South America—stations which could quickly be turned to a variety of military applications. The move also demonstrates Antarctica’s rising potential to become a theater for great power competition, and the need for a clear U.S. strategy to counter this trend.    

The South Pole has been absent from conversations about U.S. national security and grand strategy. In contrast to the Arctic, where rising militarization and competition over hydrocarbon resources has dominated the news cycle as of late, the Antarctic thus far has remained relatively stable. This can be credited in large part to the durability of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) which has governed the continent since treaty’s adoption in 1959. Negotiated under the Eisenhower administration, the treaty today seeks to manage existing territorial claims, prevent new ones, and prevent Antarctic mineral exploration. Over time the treaty system has also grown from a single document to include regular consultative meetings, added protocols on environmental issues, and, since 1982, a separate but closely related body to deal with Antarctic wildlife in the form of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). In the Cold War context, limiting great power competition from entering Antarctica and preventing military use of the Antarctic territory were key issues and in the mutual interest of both the United States and Soviet Union.

However, emerging technologies, sharpening competition between powers, and an increasingly multipolar world are now creating trends that may upset the decades-long consensus around the Antarctic. New icebreakers, proposals for all-weather airstrips, drones, and remote-sensing technologies promise to lower barriers to entry for many countries seeking to increase their presence. Meanwhile the mineral geology of the Antarctic, as well as its rich maritime ecosystem, offer attractive economic incentives for countries such as China to dispense with the environmental restrictions imposed by the treaty system. Finally, the explicit incorporation of the Antarctic into the national security strategies of competitors like Russia and China raise concerns for the future of a non-militarized Antarctic.

Fortunately, many of these challenges remain speculative for the time being. However, a number of scenarios could result in a deterioration of Antarctic relations, and in turn set of a cascade that may imperil the treaty system as a whole. The United States cannot afford to be caught flat-footed by these trends, and needs a new strategy to preserve the Antarctic as a realm of peaceful cooperation.

Breaking the Ice

U.S. interests in the Antarctic today remain largely unchanged from where they were 80 years ago—namely, preventing the militarization of the region and maintaining the continent as a region of primarily scientific exploration. Preventing militarization is a key interest both for ensuring the passage of ships and aircraft around the Drake Passage, as well as preventing the use of the continent for the deployment of monitoring stations and even potential weapons emplacement that could be used to attack the United States and its allies. Maintaining the Antarctic as a realm of primarily scientific exploration is a matter of both environmental and strategic concern, considering that a race to exploit mining and fishing resources would almost invariably sharpen competition for access to said resources.

What has changed dramatically however are the attendant geopolitical forces impacting the ATS. Technological developments in particular have lowered historically high barriers to access for many countries with Antarctic interests. For instance, following Australia’s decision to scrap the Davis aerodrome, which would have represented the first paved airstrip on the continent, China has moved forward with a similar plan to establish a permanent runway. Such a project would vastly augment China’s ability to move people, material, and supplies to and from the Antarctic. Modern icebreakers also facilitate access through maritime routes for a longer period each year. Finally, improved remote sensing via satellites and uncrewed vehicles makes surveying for natural resources and fishing stocks easier.

Accordingly, while the ATS has thus far proven resilient to challenges from revisionist powers, a number of scenarios could represent a breaking point for the system. One especially troubling scenario would be the discovery of significant proven natural resource deposits in the Antarctic. Based on the mineral geology of the continents and countries that previously surrounded Antarctica, the United States Geological Survey estimated as early as 1983 that Antarctica may have significant deposits of petroleum, natural gas, coal copper, iron, uranium, and likely many other minerals. However, the challenges to operating on the continent coupled with the normative and legal restrictions on economic exploitation of Antarctica has thus far been a sufficient deterrent to would-be challengers.

But advances in either mining technology or the discovery of a particularly lucrative deposit could lower the relative costs of circumventing or otherwise ignoring the ATS’ prohibition on exploitative industries. Such a development would in turn set off a chain reaction as other countries may begin a race to develop their own deposits. It would also reignite questions of territorial claims to the Antarctic. At the moment, seven countries exercise at times competing territorial claims under the ATS (the United States also maintains the right to claim territory, but has never sought this). Eroding the prohibition on mining would therefore open a host of competing territorial, economic, and even security issues, to say nothing of the environmental degradation a scramble for Antarctic resources would unleash.

While many have raised the specter of 2048—when the process to revise Article 7 of Antarctic Treaty’s environmental protocol, otherwise known as the mining ban, may be challenged—as the theoretical turning point, the above scenario could manifest in the span of a decade, if not less. Without a dedicated strategy for addressing efforts to illegally mine the Antarctic, the United States may be caught flat-footed by the pace of events, acting too late to prevent a dedicated effort at overturning the prohibition. In contrast to a dramatic discovery that kick-starts competition in the Antarctic, another scenario could be the more gradual corrosion of the treaty order ushered in by rising global tides of great power competition. If countries begin cheating or skirting the mining prohibitions, for instance, a grand scramble for Antarctica would not be necessary to eventually remove the legal and reputational penalties that have thus far prevailed in maintaining environmental protections on the continent.

Already there are worrying indicators that this consensus may be slipping. Russia has surveyed for hydrocarbons in Antarctic waters while China’s worrying track record on illegal fishing also suggests the potential for an erosion of environmental protections of marine life, a channel less dramatic than a mining rush given exploitation of marine resources is permissible and regulated under CCAMLR. It is nevertheless one which should be strenuously avoided. As rising powers seek to undercut U.S. influence in new areas, they may also come to view the Antarctic as a useful second front where Washington is underprepared to respond to disruptions. Under this scenario, 2048 may come and go without any major changes to the letter of the treaty, yet in practice the spirit of cooperation that has characterized Antarctic exploration may slowly disintegrate thanks to an increasingly fraught world order.

Mapping Rivals’ Interests in the Antarctic